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The Best (and worst) of GHG emission 
Trading Systems: Comparing the 
eU eTS with its Followers
Simone Borghesi* and Massimiliano Montini
University of Siena, Siena, Italy
The European Emission Trading System (EU ETS) is generally considered as the 
prototype system for the other Emission Trading Systems (ETSs) for the reduction of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) that are rapidly spreading around the world. To get a deeper 
understanding on the actual capacity of the EU ETS to stand as a model for the other 
ETSs, the present paper discusses the differences and similarities of the EU ETS with 
respect to the other main ETSs and the emerging trends that these systems seem 
to share, comparing the different cap-and-trade regimes in order to identify the best 
practices and the desirable features that future ETSs should have. As emerges from 
the comparative analysis performed in this article, although the followers share some 
common flaws with the EU ETS, they have also shown the capacity to innovate and 
possibly devise alternative ways to manage their own ETS regimes, which may in the 
long term jeopardize the EU leadership in the ETSs context.
Keywords: emission Trading Systems, eU eTS, California cap-and-trade system, Regional Greenhouse Gas 
initiative, Quebec cap-and-trade system, Chinese eTS pilots, comparative analysis
iNTRODUCTiON
Emission Trading is generally regarded as the main application of market-based instruments to 
environmental issues. Emission Trading Systems (ETSs) have been extensively applied since the 
1970s to solve many air and water problems (see below). In recent years, particular attention has 
been devoted to the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) to reduce climate change. 
A large body of the literature has investigated the properties of this system from a legal, economic, 
and institutional viewpoint (see Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006; Tietenberg, 2006; Ellerman et al., 2007; 
Kruger et al., 2007; Freestone and Streck, 2009; Grubb, 2009; Tuerk et al., 2009; Convery et al., 
2010; Ellerman, 2010; OECD, 2011; Olmstead and Stavins, 2012; Burtraw et  al., 2013; Delbeke 
and Vis, 2015), while other studies have investigated its environmental effectiveness (cf., for exam-
ple, Anderson and Di Maria, 2011; Rogge et  al., 2011a,b; Germà and Stephan, 2015; Calel and 
Dechezleprêtre, 2016). Following the introduction of the EU ETS, several other ETSs have been 
implemented around the world to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
The aim of this paper is to emphasize the main lessons learnt and the emerging trends of the EU 
ETS as well as of other relevant ETS regimes, comparing the different systems in order to identify 
the best practices and the desirable features that future ETS should have. Other studies (e.g., Betz 
and Sato, 2006; Perdan and Azapagic, 2011; Newell et al., 2013; Schmalensee and Stavins, 2015; PMR 
(Partnership for Market Readiness) and ICAP (International Carbon Action Partnership), 2016) 
have analyzed the existing GHG ETSs pointing out the lessons that can be learnt by each of them. The 
present paper differs from these studies in two main respects. In the first place, while most studies 
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have mainly focused on the influence that the EU ETS has had 
on the design of the other ETSs, this work emphasizes the pos-
sible existence of a mutual learning process: the EU ETS can (or 
should) learn from specific features of the others as much as the 
others have learned in this field from the European Union (EU) 
in the past. In the second place, it provides a comparison among 
existing ETSs in a historical perspective underlining the change 
of leadership (from US to EU) that occurred in the past and the 
possible new change (from EU to other, possibly linked, ETSs) 
that might occur in the future. This seems particularly relevant 
given the increasing importance that ETSs are expected to have 
among the climate change policies in the future.
To investigate the issue described above, the structure of the 
paper is the following. Section 2 briefly reviews the origin of 
the EU ETS in a historical perspective, which has seen the EU 
changing its role from follower of the early experiences in the 
United States (US) to forerunner at the international level in the 
implementation of this instrument. Section 3 discusses the main 
characteristics of the EU ETS as it currently stands, pointing out 
the lessons learnt from its implementation. Section 4 analyzes 
the effectiveness of the EU ETS in promoting technological 
innovation and in reducing GHG emissions, on the basis of the 
early experience provided by the first two application periods. 
Section 5 describes the worldwide sprawling of the ETS, look-
ing in particular at some selected “followers” of the EU ETS, 
which seem to be quite comparable with the European proto-
type, namely the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) 
introduced in the Eastern part of the US, and the cap-and-trade 
systems of California and Quebec.1 Section 6 discusses a few 
emerging trends that are common to the various ETSs taken 
into account and the current prospects for ETS cooperation 
and coordination in the future. Section 7 summarizes the best 
and worst features of the ETSs examined in the paper, drawing 
attention on the main positive and negative aspects that emerge 
from in the application experiences discussed above. The final 
section concludes emphasizing some important elements that 
can be drawn from the comparative analysis performed in the 
paper.
THe eU eTS: FROM FOLLOweR 
TO FOReRUNNeR
Following the introduction of the Clean Air Act, in the 1970s, 
the first cap-and-trade systems were introduced in the USA 
to curb air emissions. These early experiences were so suc-
cessful that other countries decided to implement their own 
ETSs to address various environmental problems. For instance, 
Australia has made extensive use of tradable allowances to 
reduce water pollution and consumption since the early 1990s 
(Borghesi, 2013), while the United Kingdom (UK) introduced 
1 A few hints will be given whenever possible also on the pilot ETSs that have been 
recently implemented in China. As explained below, however, much less informa-
tion is available so far on these application experiences, therefore, when discussing 
the “followers,” we will focus mainly on the most advanced North-American 
experiences indicated above.
in 2002 the first broad application of a GHG trading scheme 
(Smith and Swierzbinski, 2007).
The EU, on the contrary, for a long time preferred a policy 
approach that was more based on a “command and control” 
environmental regulation, at least until the 1990s, when the 
European Commission firstly promoted the adoption of a 
EU-wide carbon tax. Although this proposal was eventually 
abandoned, mainly because of the strong opposition of the 
European industrial sector, this marked an important change 
in the European attitude on the appropriate environmental 
policy instruments and in the following years the EU started 
to progressively shift toward a larger adoption of market-based 
instruments (Grubb et al., 2014).
Subsequently, the EU, following the US experience in the 
application of the ETS to air emissions, introduced its own ETS 
by Directive 2003/87/EC (2003). The EU ETS was initially applied 
to CO2 emissions and a few sectors only (energy activities – such 
as oil refineries – production and processing of ferrous metals, 
mineral industry, pulp, and paper industry). Later, Directive 
2008/101/EC (2008) extended the scope of application of the 
EU ETS to the aviation sector, so that emissions produced by all 
flights from, to, and within the European Economic Area (i.e., 
the 28 EU Member States (MS), plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway) should have being covered by the EU ETS, as of 2012.2 
Subsequently, Directive 2009/29/EC (2009) revised the whole 
EU ETS scheme, further extending its scope of application to 
additional sectors (petrochemicals, ammonia, aluminum) and 
gases (N2O and PFCs).
The progressive change of the environmental policy strategy 
adopted by the EU has eventually led the EU to overtake the 
US in the use of the ETS as the main policy tool. Indeed, while 
the EU kept on extending the EU ETS up to its present record 
dimensions, in the US ETSs for GHGs are applied only in some 
regions (i.e., California and some of the Northeast and Mid-
Atlantic States) and not to the US as a whole.3 As a consequence, 
the EU and the US ended up inverting their positions in the 
2 However, the EU ETS requirements were provisionally suspended in 2012 for 
flights to and from non-European countries, by means of the so-called “stop-the-
clock-decision.” This was mainly done to allow negotiations in the context of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) on a possible global market-
based measure applying to aviation emissions. The suspension measures were 
renewed also for the period 2013–2016, so that, practically, so far only emissions 
produced by (internal) flights occurring within the European Economic Area fall 
under the EU ETS.
3 In August 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency (2015) adopted the Clean 
Power Plan (CPP) that for the first time sets federal limits on carbon emissions, 
with a view to reduce emissions from power plants by 32% in 2030, as compared to 
2005 levels. The CPP imposes specific and differentiated targets to each of the US 
States, leaving them a certain margin of discretion on how to reduce their emissions 
and on developing their own national plan to meet the assigned target. As some 
authors have underlined, the CPP “enables and encourages state-level and multi-
state emissions trading” (Schmalensee and Stavins, 2015, p. 16). However, despite 
the broad support enjoyed in many States, the CPP also has several opponents and 
it has been subject to a legal challenge. Pending a decision on the merits of the case, 
in February 2016 the US Supreme Court provisionally suspended the enforcement 
of the CPP (Goldenberg, 2016). This might cause a long delay in the planned shift 
towards cleaner energy and in the progressive decarbonisation of the US electricity 
production sector.
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international arena: the EU passed from follower to forerunner 
in the application of ETSs, while the opposite happened to 
the US.
This process was correctly described by Ellerman (2010) as a 
change in leadership in terms of environmental policies at a global 
level so that most countries, including the US itself, consider the 
EU ETS as a prototype to be followed in the ETS field. However, 
some criticalities that emerged in the functioning of the EU ETS, 
together with the rapid evolution of ETSs around the world, cast 
some doubts on the capacity of the EU to maintain its leadership 
and stay ahead of the chasing group in the years to come. To get 
a deeper understanding on this issue, in the next paragraphs we 
try to emphasize the main lessons learnt from the application of 
the EU ETS and compare it with the trends emerging in the other 
ETSs around the world.
THe eU eTS: FeATUReS AND PROBLeMS
The analysis of the EU ETS Directive in the first two phases of 
application (2005–2007 and 2008–2012)4 shows some remarkable 
achievements, but also a few important shortcomings.
The main achievement of the EU ETS is given by the records 
it established, as it is so far the largest carbon market in the world 
and the first transboundary cap-and-trade system. In fact, the 
giant European market includes 31 countries (the 28 EU MS plus 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway) and covers more than 11,000 
installations. The unexpected capacity of the EU to establish 
such a broad system in a relatively short time is by far the most 
important feature that distinguishes the EU ETS from previous 
experiences in this field. The advantage of such a large market size 
goes far beyond all the other well-known theoretical advantages 
of an ETS system, such as the induced technological innovation, 
the concrete application of the “polluter pays” principle as well 
as the increased flexibility as compared to traditional command 
and control instruments. The large scope of the EU ETS market, 
in particular, enhances competition among the economic actors 
involved and broadens the possibility to find buyers for the 
available allowances, thus encouraging participants to pursue 
eco-innovation patterns aimed at increasing emissions reduc-
tions. Moreover, the EU ETS has also a symbolic value, which 
goes beyond purely economic considerations and demonstrates 
the will of the EU to stand as a leader in the international envi-
ronmental policy context. This leading attitude, which the EU 
showed in the past with regard to command and control tools, 
now extends to the use of market-based instruments that were 
once a prerogative of the US.
On the other hand, some shortcomings, which tend to weaken 
its effectiveness, have emerged in the implementation of the EU 
4 We will focus here mainly on the first two phases of the EU ETS since few data are 
currently available on the initial part of the third phase (2013–2020). Indeed, if we 
exclude the carbon price (which is available on a daily basis), most EU ETS-related 
indicators are released with a significant lag by the European Commission. For 
instance, information on transactions in the EU ETS are yet to be released for the 
year 2013 in the EU Transaction Log, the official EU registry of all transactions 
taking place in the EU carbon market.
ETS. More specifically, it is possible to identify three main prob-
lems that have hindered the functioning of the system in the first 
two phases: (i) price volatility, (ii) governance problems, and (iii) 
monitoring problems.
First, a high price volatility characterized the first two phases 
of the EU ETS (2005–2012, see Figure 1).5 The observed price 
volatility increased uncertainty among the firms operating on the 
EU ETS, which may have induced some of them to postpone costly 
investments in low-carbon technologies in the absence of stable 
market price signals (Gronwald and Ketterer, 2012; Gronwald and 
Hintermann, 2015). In the initial phase (2005–2007), this price 
volatility was mainly caused by an over-allocation of emission 
allowances. Furthermore, the latter could not be banked since the 
regulator wanted to keep Phase II (which coincided with the first 
Kyoto compliance period (CP) starting in 2008) separated from 
Phase I, the pilot program period. This idea, which in principle 
appeared a perfectly logical way of introducing a new system in 
a progressive way, however, had detrimental effects on the price 
of the allowances: spot prices collapsed basically to 0, at €0.06/
ton, by the final quarter of 2007, while contract futures prices 
for Phase II allowances were above €20/ton.6 In the second phase 
(2008–2012), price volatility was mainly due to a sharp fall in 
the allowances’ demand deriving from the deep economic crisis.7 
Moreover, in the first two phases, the existence of an excessively 
decentralized system and the presence of too generic rules for 
the national caps contributed to further augment the oversupply 
problem.
This leads us to a second main problem characterizing the 
EU ETS, particularly in phases I and II, what can be defined 
as a “governance” problem. Indeed, MS initially had too much 
freedom in defining the national allocation plans (NAPs) for 
allowances. As a result, most NAPs ended up allocating too 
many emission allowances, mainly because of the political 
pressure on the Governments from interest groups who wanted 
to receive more allowances (Gilbert et  al., 2004; Sijm, 2005). 
Similarly, over-allocation also characterized the second phase; 
in such a period, the European Commission asked MS to modify 
their original NAPs proposals in 11 cases of 12 (with the only 
exception of the UK), with the effect that the number of emis-
sion allowances originally proposed by MS was greatly reduced. 
Moreover, the existence of too generic rules for the setting of 
national emission caps caused a lack of adequate stringency of 
5 In Phase III, price volatility was lower than that in Phase II (the price range being 
€5.84 in Phase III versus €14.36 in Phase II). Moreover, in Phase III (during the years 
2013–2015), the average annual price was also lower than that in Phase II (€6.03 
versus €8.12). As mentioned above, we will focus here on the first two phases that, 
differently from Phase III, provide complete information on all transactions details.
6 See Schleich et al. (2006) for an analysis of the implications of the EU decision 
to ban banking in Phase I and of the related efficiency losses based on simulation 
results. See also Clò et al. (2013) for a discussion of the impact of the EUA price 
drop on the effectiveness of the trading scheme and on the risk of carbon lock-in 
that the carbon price fall can generate.
7 Koch et al. (2014) investigate the drivers of the variations of the EUA price in 
Phase II and find that economic recession is a robust explanatory variable for the 
observed price fall, while renewable policies and the use of international credits 
(that are also often invoked as carbon price drivers) have had a moderate impact 
on the EU ETS carbon price.
FiGURe 1 | intertemporal evolution of eUA prices and major events in the period 2005–2015. Source: authors’ own elaboration based on EEA (2015).
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the system. Beyond the differences concerning cap-setting, MS 
showed also other remarkable differences at the allocation level.8 
Thus, for instance, while most MS allocated allowances for free 
in the initial phase, some MS (Denmark, Ireland, and Lithuania) 
preferred to auction a share of them to cover administrative costs. 
Even within the group of countries that allocated allowances for 
free on the basis of historical emissions (grandfathering), there 
were remarkable differences on how to cope with the early action 
problem, namely, the fact that the historic emissions criterion 
damaged virtuous firms that had already adopted specific 
measures to reduce their own emissions before the EU ETS was 
implemented. In this regard, Germany explicitly accounted for 
this aspect by using a higher compliance factor for early-moving 
firms, other countries (e.g., Italy) implicitly recognized early 
actions by using benchmarks that favored efficient allocations, 
whereas others (UK and Finland) granted no credits for early 
action simply stating that it was impossible to take it into proper 
account in an objective way.
National criteria differed also as far as newcomers and closures 
were concerned. Most MS required allowances to be returned 
in case of closure of an installation, but in some countries (e.g., 
Italy, Germany, Austria) allowances could be transferred to a new 
installation. As Betz et al. (2004) (p. 385) point out, this may alter 
competition “since by nature only incumbent firms may benefit 
from such allowance transfers.” As to newcomers, all countries 
8 See Betz et al. (2004), Betz and Sato (2006) for an in-depth discussion of the dif-
ferent design of the NAPs across MS in the initial phase and of their consequences 
in terms of firms’ competitiveness.
reserved allowances for new entrants, but their share ranged 
widely from less than 1% of the ET-budget (in Germany, Austria, 
and Slovenia) to more than 20% in Latvia. Moreover, different 
countries adopted different kinds of benchmarking for the alloca-
tion of new entrants, with some MS using best available technolo-
gies as benchmark while others adopting specific emission levels 
for homogeneous products.
The existence of so many differences on such important 
aspects could severely alter competition among firms subject to 
the EU ETS. To address this problem, therefore, Directive 2009/29 
abolished the national competence to draft allocation plans and 
centralized all the relevant EU ETS decision-making power in the 
hands of the European Commission.
A third main issue that clearly emerged in phases I and II 
concerned the existence of some monitoring problems and 
of relevant shortcomings in the functioning of the national 
registries in some MS. Several frauds occurred in the EU ETS 
market during the first two phases, which highly undermined 
the effectiveness of the overall EU ETS showing monitoring and 
transparency problems. As Frunza et al. (2011) have shown, the 
volume of allowances being traded in the Paris stock exchange 
drastically collapsed once the so-called value-added tax (VAT) 
fraud was discovered.9 As argued by Borghesi and Montini (2014) 
9 By VAT fraud, we refer to the practice of some agents of importing allowances 
VAT-free (due to the zero rate of taxation on intra-community cross-border trade) 
and sell them in the importing country with VAT charged and afterwards disappear 
instead of paying the VAT to the government. To make an example, the fraudster 
may buy allowances from firm A located in another EU country and then sell them 
in its own country to firm B charging the VAT. If the fraudster disappears without 
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(p. 118) “this suggests that the permit exchanges in that market 
were probably spurred more by the illegal activity that took place 
in the absence of proper regulation, rather than by the actual need 
to cover emissions.” Monitoring problems, however, were not 
limited to the VAT fraud but concerned the whole functioning of 
the online trading system. Thus, for instance, in November 2010 
the cement-maker Holcim declared that 1.6 million emission 
allowances disappeared from its account in the Romanian reg-
istry. The same happened in January 2011 to Blackstone Global 
Ventures, which declared that 475,000 emission allowances 
had vanished from its account in the Czech Republic, with an 
estimated total loss of about 7 million euros. As a consequence, 
many countries (the Czech Republic, Greece, Estonia, Poland, 
and Austria) temporarily closed their carbon trading registries 
and the European Commission decided to suspend spot trades 
(75% of the ETS market) until January 26, 2011.
To properly address these problems, the EU adopted new anti-
fraud measures and a new Regulation on registry (EU Regulation 
389/2013), replacing national registries with a Union Registry 
administered at central level by the European Commission.
On the basis of the pros and cons just shown above, even if 
it cannot be denied, as Ellerman rightly affirmed, that the EU 
ETS system is to be considered a prototype in the ETS context, 
this does not mean that the system was immune from relevant 
shortcomings, which had to be managed and solved through the 
years in order to increase the effectiveness of the EU cap-and-
trade scheme.
Some relevant shortcomings were addressed by EU Directive 
2009/29, in particular with regard to the over-allocation and 
surplus of EUAs. However, the amendments introduced did 
not solve all the problems related to the surplus of EUAs in the 
European carbon market, which continued to negatively affect 
the system and undermine its effectiveness.
In order to address such persistent problems, the European 
Commission proposed the back-loading initiative, which was 
adopted by the Council and the Parliament in 2013, with the aim 
of postponing auctions for 900 million allowances planned for the 
period 2014–2016, so as to rebalance supply and demand in the 
EU ETS market and reduce price volatility.10
However, the back-loading initiative was meant to represent 
just a temporary solution to be used during the EU ETS 3rd phase 
(up to 2020), and the European Commission clarified from the 
very beginning that a more structural EU ETS reform was neces-
sary, in order to reduce the EUAs surplus and limit the related 
negative effects on the functioning of the European carbon 
paying the VAT, when firm B reclaims the VAT from the government the Member 
State will suffer a loss since it has to reimburse an amount of money that it did not 
receive from the fraudster. This kind of fraud, that exploits the way VAT is treated 
within multi-jurisdictional trading, has applied to several other items in the past 
(e.g. microchips, mobile phones, health products, jewellery, etc.) causing relevant 
losses to the EU budget (cf. Frunza et al., 2011).
10 See Decision No 1359/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 17 December 2013 amending Directive 2003/87/EC clarifying provisions on 
the timing of auctions of greenhouse gas. See also Commission Regulation (EU) 
No. 176/2014 of 25 February 2014 amending Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010 in 
particular to determine the volumes of greenhouse gas emission allowances to be 
auctioned in 2013–2020.
market.11 For this reason, in 2014 the European Commission 
proposed the establishment of a market stability reserve.12 
The “Proposal on the market stability reserve” was presented 
alongside the EU Communication on “A policy framework for 
climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030.” The market 
stability reserve has a twofold aim. On the one side, it aims 
at addressing and managing the over-allocation and surplus of 
EUAs described above. On the other side, it aims at increasing 
the resilience of the European regime, by adjusting the number 
of EUAs to be auctioned, depending on various market circum-
stances. The market stability reserve is meant to operate in an 
“automatic manner,” on the basis of pre-determined criteria and 
conditions, which will effectively reduce the discretionary power 
of the Commission during its implementation, while increasing 
the overall transparency and effectiveness of the EU ETS. The 
Proposal on the market stability reserve was approved by the 
European Parliament on 7 July 2015 and by the Council on 6 
October 2015.13 As a consequence, as stated by the Commission, 
“the market stability reserve shall be established in 2018 and 
the placing of allowances in the reserve shall operate from 1 
January 2019.”14
For the time being, it is impossible to determine whether the 
back-loading initiative (to be relied upon in the EU ETS third phase) 
and the market stability reserve (to be relied upon in the EU ETS 
fourth phase) will be able to successfully address the shortcomings 
of the European carbon market described above.15 What one can 
certainly infer from the analysis of the price evolution reported in 
Figure 1 is that the debate surrounding the decision to implement 
a market stability reserve had only a marginal effect on the EUA 
price, which remained rather stable since its initial proposal by the 
European Commission in 2014. It should be highlighted, however, 
that the market stability reserve may prove a particularly contro-
versial solution, especially if compared with an alternative option, 
namely the introduction of a price floor, which might have been 
chosen instead, in order to reach more or less the same objectives. 
The European Commission (2012) (p. 10) argued against the intro-
duction of a price floor, claiming that the latter “would alter the 
very nature of the current EU ETS being a quantity-based market 
instrument.” According to the Commission, moreover, decisions 
on the appropriate price floor level would involve substantial 
government arrangements so that “the carbon price may become 
primarily a product of administrative and political decisions (or 
11 For a critical discussion of the back-loading and of the other structural measures 
proposed by the European Commission to reform the EU ETS see de Perthuis and 
Trotignon (2014). See also Caton et al. (2015) for an analysis of the implications of 
back-loading on carbon prices that compares the CO2 equilibrium price with and 
without this policy measure.
12 See COM (2014) 20, Proposal for the establishment and operation of a market 
stability reserve for the EU ETS.
13 At the moment of writing, the Decision of the European Parliament and of the 
Council concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve is 
still awaiting publication on the Official Journal of the European Union. 
14 Source: European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/reform/
index_en.htm
15 See Kollenberg and Taschini (2016) for a theoretical model that investigates the 
potential consequences of the market stability reserve mechanism using a stochas-
tic partial equilibrium framework.
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expectations about them), rather than a result of the interplay of 
market supply and demand”.
As we will see below (see The Other Main ETSs: RGGI, 
California, and Quebec), a price floor has been commonly 
adopted by some of the most relevant ETSs currently existing 
around the world (e.g., the US-based California and RGGI ones) 
where it proved to be an effective solution to avoid the price col-
lapse observed instead in the EU ETS.
eFFeCTS OF THe eU eTS ON  
eCO-iNNOvATiON AND 
POLLUTiON ABATeMeNT
Two particularly important aspects for the assessment of the EU 
ETS performance concern its impact on pollution abatement 
and on eco-innovation (EI).16 These two issues are strictly related 
since the environmental effectiveness of the EU ETS (i.e., its 
capacity to lower GHG emissions) is heavily influenced by its 
capacity to induce eco-innovations through carbon pricing. The 
latter can promote the adoption and diffusion of environmental 
friendly technologies by firms that do not want to pay the costs 
of purchasing emission allowances and/or that wish to get a first 
mover advantage by shifting to a new technology before their 
competitors. This incentive to shift the technological paradigm 
obviously rises with an increase in carbon price and decreases 
with a higher price volatility that generates uncertainty on the 
expected returns of investing in EI.17
In the last few years, a growing number of studies have tried 
to assess the EI effects of the EU ETS.18 Two main research lines 
have been adopted for this purpose. Some scholars have based 
their empirical analyses on surveys of managerial interviews 
(e.g., Hoffmann, 2007; Aghion et  al., 2009; Anderson et  al., 
2011; Martin et al., 2011; Rogge et al., 2011a,b; Schmidt et al., 
2012), while others have tested the weak version of the Porter 
hypothesis introducing the EU ETS among the covariates of 
their econometric models (see Abrell et  al., 2011; Borghesi 
et  al., 2015; Calel and Dechezleprêtre, 2016).19 Although this 
literature is still in its early stages of development and mainly 
focused on the early phases of the EU ETS due to a time lag in 
the data availability, the main conclusion that seems to emerge 
so far is that the EU ETS had at most a very weak impact on 
EI. Innovative investments were probably discouraged by the 
high price volatility observed in the first phase and by the time 
initially needed to fully understand and discover the function-
ing of this relatively new market. But the limited amount of 
16 See Kemp (2010) for the definition of eco-innovation distinguishing between 
product, process, and organisational innovations.
17 See, for instance, Popp (2002) for an empirical analysis of the innovation effects 
induced by energy prices in general.
18 See Martin et al. (2015) for a review of the literature on this issue.
19 As it is well known, the so-called Porter hypothesis (Porter, 1991) argues that 
environmental regulation can have positive effects on firms’ competitiveness. 
Such a hypothesis has been the object of two interpretations: (i) environmental 
regulation may trigger innovation (“weak” version of the Porter hypothesis) and 
(ii) induced innovation may enhance firms’ productivity (“strong” version). The 
aforementioned studies, therefore, focus on the weak version of the Porter assump-
tion taking the EU ETS as specific example of environmental regulation.
eco-innovations was mainly driven by relatively low emission 
prices that obviously provided little financial incentives to R&D 
and/or to the diffusion of mitigating technologies. This weak EI 
effect of the EU ETS seems to apply to industrial sectors both at 
the EU level (e.g., Schmidt et al., 2012, for the power sector) and 
at individual countries level, as suggested by analyses conducted 
on the Italian cement and ceramic industries (Borghesi et  al., 
2012), the German electricity sector (Hoffmann, 2007) as well 
as the paper industry both in Italy (Pontogolio, 2010) and in 
Germany (Rogge et al., 2011a,b).
While a certain consensus seems to emerge on the (weak) EI 
effect of the EU ETS in the first two phases, its environmental 
effectiveness is more controversial. As a matter of fact, it is hard 
to assess whether the application of the EU ETS can be considered 
as a main driver of the observed emission reduction or whether 
there exists a purely spurious correlation between the two events.
Some early studies have produced interesting results that 
try to address this difficult question focusing on the first EU 
ETS phase. Performing a counterfactual analysis, for instance, 
Ellerman and Buchner (2008) estimate that in Phase I CO2 emis-
sions were between 2.4 and 4.7% lower than what they would 
have been without the EU ETS. A similar conclusion is achieved 
by Anderson and Di Maria (2011) who estimate that the emission 
reduction that can be ascribed to the EU ETS was about 2.8%.
Other factors, however, contributed to the emission abatement 
observed during the implementation of the EU ETS. In particular, 
an increase in average temperatures and in fuel prices has influ-
enced the reduction in energy consumption and, therefore, also 
in EU emissions in the last few years (EEA, 2012b, 2013). These 
factors helped the EU go remarkably beyond the emissions reduc-
tion target (−8% by 2012 as compared to 1990) that was agreed 
under the Kyoto Protocol. The data periodically reported by the 
European Environment Agency confirm a rapidly declining emis-
sions trend: the overall EU27 GHG emissions were 7.7% below the 
1990 levels in 2006, 11.3% below the target in 2008, 18.4% in 2011, 
19.2% in 2012, and 20.7% in 2013 (EEA, 2012a, 2013, 2014a,b,c,d). 
This shows that the Kyoto targets was largely surpassed and that 
the emission reduction target for 2020 (−20%) has been achieved 
by the EU much earlier than originally expected.
This overall positive performance, however, hides remarkable 
differences within the EU between the original EU-15 countries 
and the new MS that joined the EU after 2004. In fact, in the new 
MS GHG emissions decreased by 38.5% between 1990 and 2013 
as a consequence of the sharp decline of their production levels, 
whereas in the EU-15 emissions fell by 16.4% in the same period 
(EEA, 2014e).
Furthermore, the observed emissions abatement has been 
largely influenced by the deep economic recession that has sig-
nificantly hit the European industrial production. Indeed, before 
the crisis, the EU-15 emissions were much above the intermediate 
target needed to achieve the final Kyoto target. In 2008, when the 
crisis started to bite, EU-15 emissions were still only 6.5% below 
the 1990 level (EEA, 2010; Borghesi, 2011). These considerations 
suggest that the economic recession and the enlargement of the 
EU to Central and Eastern European countries have certainly 
played a crucial role in helping the EU achieve the Kyoto Protocol 
target.
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THe OTHeR MAiN eTSs: RGGi, 
CALiFORNiA, AND QUeBeC
While the EU was revising and fine tuning its own ETS, on the 
basis of the lessons learnt in phases one and two, a wide array 
of other ETSs emerged around the world. Among them, we will 
focus in particular on three ETS regimes as they seem to be quite 
comparable with the EU ETS: the RGGI, the Californian cap-
and-trade system, and the Quebec cap-and-trade system.
Several other countries and regions started to implement 
their own ETS or are planning to do so in the near future, such as 
Japan (Sopher and Mansell, 2014a), South Korea (Park and Hong, 
2014), Kazakhstan (Kossoy et al., 2015), Switzerland (Sopher and 
Mansell, 2014b), New Zealand, Mexico, Brazil, and so on (Hood, 
2010; Newell et  al., 2013).20 Among them, particular attention 
should be devoted to China that between 2013 and 2014 started 
implementing seven pilot projects in selected cities or provinces 
(Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Guangdong, Hubei, 
Shenzhen) with the goal of developing a nation-wide ETS in the 
future (Ecofys, 2013; Jotzo et al., 2013; De Boer et al., 2015; Kossoy 
et al., 2015).21 Despite the important role that these Chinese ETS 
programs may have in the years to come, these pilot programs are 
still in their early stages and the limited data availability concern-
ing their recent application prevents for the moment a proper 
comparison with the main ETSs examined here. For this reason, 
in what follows we will focus mainly on the more advanced 
ETS experiences of RGGI, California, and Quebec, providing 
information on and comparisons with the Chinese pilot ETSs 
whenever possible.
The RGGI is a CO2 Budget Trading Program established as 
a result of a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2005 
by a group of 10 USA States wishing to develop a Cap & Trade 
Programme covering the power sector. It started in 2009 and, 
although quite limited in scope, it represents the first carbon 
emissions Cap & Trade experience in the USA. After the 
withdraw of New Jersey in 2011, it currently applies to nine US 
States (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont) and is 
structured in 3-year CPs, named “control periods”: 2009–2011, 
2012–2014, and 2015–2017. It sets an overall multi-State-wide 
cap on the CO2 allowances distributed among the participating 
States, which allocate them to the covered installations. Currently, 
it applies to 168 facilities distributed in the territory of the 
involved States.
20 The number of carbon pricing instruments has been increasing by 90% since 
2012, reaching today 38 instruments that span across 39 national jurisdictions 
and 23 subnational jurisdictions, covering about 12% of global GHG emissions 
(Kossoy et al., 2015). A detailed analysis of all the existing ETSs goes beyond the 
scope and admissible length of this paper that intends to present only a selection 
of the most relevant ETSs. The interested reader is referred to Kossoy et al. (2015) 
and PMR and ICAP (2016) for an in-depth and exhaustive description of most 
existing programs. 
21 A national ETS is planned to start in China in 2017. However, from a survey 
conducted on 304 China-based stakeholders (de Boer et al., 2015), it turns out 
that the vast majority of respondents expect that a national ETS will not be fully 
operational before 2020.
The Californian Cap & Trade System, introduced by the 
Global Warming Solution Act of 2006, started in 2013 and covers 
almost 600 facilities, corresponding to 85% of the country’s GHG 
emissions. It is structured upon three CPs: (1) 2013–2014; (2) 
2015–2017; (3) 2018–2020. In particular, in the first period, the 
scheme covered only the large industry and electricity sectors; 
while from the second period onward, it has been extended also 
to fuel transport, distribution, and generation.
The Quebec cap-and-trade system was established in 2011, 
by the Regulation Respecting a cap-and-trade system for GHG 
Emission Allowances, and started in 2013. It initially covered 
almost 80% of Quebec’s GHG emissions, and such percent-
age has increased up to 85% from 2015. It is structured upon 
the same three CPs as the Californian Cap & Trade System, 
namely: 2013–2014; 2015–2017; 2018–2020. In the first CP, the 
scheme covered industrial and electricity sectors only, while 
from the second CP onward it has been extended to fossil fuel 
distribution.
All the ETS regimes described above closely resemble the EU 
approach to ETS. Table  1 below provides a comparison of the 
selected ETSs, highlighting the most relevant aspects underlying 
their design and features. Table A1 in Appendix reports available 
information on the Chinese pilot projects focusing on the same 
aspects examined in Table 1 for comparability reasons. For the 
purpose of the comparative analysis, the EU ETS will be consid-
ered as a benchmark against which the other relevant ETSs will 
be described and assessed.
Table 1 shows that, as far as their scope is concerned, all ETSs 
examined here – with the exception of RGGI – present several 
relevant similarities and common features.
For instance, they all cover a wide range of GHG emissions 
beyond CO2. In addition to that, following the European model, 
all the regimes analyzed establish exemptions for installations 
below certain similar thresholds. Furthermore, all ETSs have 
been divided in three CPs, although these obviously differ across 
the various regimes because of their different starting dates (with 
the exception of California and Quebec that started together and 
adopted the same CPs).
Moreover, all the ETSs analyzed foresee the possibilities for 
linking with other project-based GHG emissions offset pro-
grams. For instance, the EU ETS allows the use of CO2 reduction 
units generated through the implementation of the project-
based mechanisms foreseen under the Kyoto Protocol (Clean 
Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation). Following 
a similar approach, the RGGI, the Californian, and the Quebec 
cap-and-trade systems allow the use of credits produced from 
national offset projects carried out in specific sectors.
An additional common feature to most of the ETS analyzed 
refers to the possibility of applying banking and/or borrowing. 
In this respect, in line with the EU approach, all the three ETSs 
analyzed (California, RGGI, and Quebec) allow banking, but not 
borrowing of the allowances.22 Finally, with regard to the preferred 
22 As pointed out by Newell et al. (2014), banking is widely recognized as “an impor-
tant tool to avoid short-term supply-demand imbalances and associated price 
movements.” See Chevallier (2012) for a survey of the banking literature. Notice 
that borrowing is allowed in the EU ETS only within compliance periods: indeed, 
TABLe 1 | The eU eTS and the other main eTSs: a comparison.
Starting 
date
Compliance 
periods 
(CP)
Target Benchmark 
year
GHG Sectors Threshold Deadlines 
(month/
day)
Price 
ceilings 
and floor
Allocation 
method
exemptions 
for carbon 
leakage
Offset 
programs
Banking/
Borrowing
Sanctions
EU 2005 First CP: 
2005–2007; 
second CP: 
2008–2012; 
third CP: 
2013–2020
Overall reduction: 
20% with 
respect to 1990 
levels by 2020, 
subsequently 
updated to 21% 
below 2005 
levels by 2020
1990 CO2, N2O, 
PFC
Power and heat 
generation; 
energy-intensive 
industry sectors 
including oil 
refineries, steel 
works, and 
production of 
iron, aluminum, 
metals, cement, 
lime, glass, 
ceramics, 
pulp, paper, 
cardboard, 
acids, and 
bulk organic 
chemicals; civil 
aviation
≥25 
ktCO2e/
year 
≥35 MW; 
sector-
specific 
threshold 
for other 
sources
04/30 Neither 
ceiling nor 
floor
Shift from 
grandfathering 
to auctioning
Yes Yes  
(CDM/JI)
Banking 
allowed. 
Borrowing 
allowed 
only within 
compliance 
periods
100€*tCO2 
excess 
emissions + 
surrendering 
of missing 
allowances 
Annual 
reduction: 
−1.74% wrt 
2005
California 2013 First CP: 
2013–2014; 
second CP: 
2015–2017; 
third CP: 
2018–2020
Overall reduction: 
by 2020 return 
to 1990 GHG 
levels; by 2040, 
−40% from 1990 
GHG levels; by 
2050, −80% 
from 1990 GHG 
levels
1990 CO2, CH4, 
N2O, SF6, 
HFC, PFC, 
NF3
Until 2015: 
first delivery 
of electricity. 
After 2015: gas 
and liquid fuels 
delivery
≥25 
ktCO2e/
year
04/10 (non 
power) 
06/01 
(power)
Price floor: 
10 $/
m3tCO2 in 
both 2012 
and 2013, 
rising 
5% per 
year (plus 
inflation) 
from 2014
Auctioning Yes Yes 
(national)
Banking not 
borrowing
4*excess 
emissions
Annual reduction: 
−2% through 
2015, and −3% 
in the period 
2015–2020
RGGI 2009 First CP: 
2009–2011; 
second CP: 
2012–2014; 
third CP: 
2015–18
Overall reduction: 
−50% from 2005 
GHG levels
2009 CO2 Fossil fuels only ≥25 MW 03/01 Price floor: 
1.93 $/
tCO2 in 
2012 
(increasing 
with 
consumer 
price 
index)
Auctioning No Yes 
(national)
Banking not 
borrowing
3*excess 
emissions
Annual reduction: 
−2.5% from 
2015 through 
2018, totaling 
10% below 2009 
levels in 2019
(Continued)
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allocation method, a common feature shared by all the regimes 
taken into account is the progressive shift from grandfathering 
to auctioning, originally envisaged in the EU ETS.23 Such a shift 
generated widespread worries within the industrial community 
of all countries, which led everywhere to the adoption of specific 
provisions against the risk of delocalization of productive activi-
ties toward “ETS-free countries.” In fact, in order to protect the 
sectors potentially exposed to carbon leakage, all the various ETS, 
apart from RGGI, include similar exemptions.24
Beside the common features and similarities shown above, a 
closer look at the ETS regimes taken into account reveals that 
the followers took a different path on some relevant issues with 
respect to the pattern set by the EU. As to the sanctioning rules, 
for instance, while all ETS examined foresee the obligation for 
non-compliant firms to surrender the missing allowances in a 
subsequent period, some remarkable differences apply. In fact, 
the EU ETS provides for the application of a fixed monetary sanc-
tion of 100€ for each missing ton, whereas the RGGI, Quebec, 
and Californian ETSs opted for a different sanctioning regime, 
establishing that non-compliant firms installations have to return, 
respectively, three times (for RGGI and Quebec) and four times 
(for California) as many allowances as those not surrendered in 
each given period.25 The existence of different sanctioning regimes 
may imply large differences in the complying costs for the opera-
tors being sanctioned. Just to provide an example, consider the 
current prices of EU ETS, RGGI, and Californian allowances.26 
Given the corresponding sanction systems, a firm that emitted 
50 tons in excess of the allowances at disposal would have to pay 
5274.5€ in the EU ETS, 2164€ in the Californian system while 
only 693.3€ in the RGGI.
As far as the target setting is concerned, while Quebec has 
chosen the same target of the EU, corresponding to a −20% 
emission reduction by 2020 (as compared to 1990 levels), the 
US-based regimes have chosen different paths (see Table  1). 
allocation for the current year takes place in February, while the deadline to sur-
render allowances for emissions of the previous year is end of April. In California 
borrowing is allowed only under very specific and restrictive conditions (see PMR 
and ICAP, 2016), whereas it is never allowed in the RGGI and in the Quebec ETS.
23 Notice that progressive transition towards full auctioning is planned for the 
future also in the Shenzhen ETS pilot, the first to be launched in China. At the 
moment, however, allowances are mainly grandfathered in all Chinese ETS pilots 
(see Table A1 in Appendix).
24 The existence and the entity of a carbon leakage effect induced by the imple-
mentation of environmental policies is the subject of a heated debate and of 
an extensive theoretical and empirical literature. See, among the others, Taylor 
(2004), Dean et al. (2009), Chung (2014) for analyses of the possible delocalisation 
effect of environmental regulation in general, Martin et al. (2014a and 2014b), 
Borghesi et al. (2016a) for a discussion of the effect of the EU ETS regulation in 
particular.
25 The amount of the penalties and the way non-compliant firms are sanctioned 
are even more diverse across the Chinese ETS pilots (see Table A1 in Appendix).
26 To perform the numerical calculation we used the €/US$ exchange rate as of 20 
April 2016 and the following allowances prices taken by the data sources indicated 
among brackets on the same day: (i) EU ETS= 5.49€ per allowance (https://
www.eex.com/en/market-data/emission-allowances/spot-market/european-
emission-allowances#!/2016/04/20); (ii) CARB: $12.29 (equivalent to 10.82€) per 
allowance (http://calcarbondash.org); (iii) RGGI: $5.25 (equivalent to 4.622€) 
per allowance (https://rggi-coats.org/eats/rggi/index.cfm?fuseaction=reportsv2.
price_rpt&clearfuseattribs=true).
FiGURe 2 | intertemporal evolution of emission allowance prices on different eTS markets. Source: authors’ own elaboration based on EEX data (https://
www.eex.com/en#/en), CARB data (http://calcarbondash.org), and RGGI data (https://rggi-coats.org/eats/rggi/index.cfm?fuseaction=reportsv2.price_
rpt&clearfuseattribs=true).
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In fact, California merely aims at returning its emissions to the 
1990 levels by 2020, while RGGI has chosen a stabilization target 
for 2014 and a 10% reduction target for 2020 (as compared to 
2009 levels). In this regard, the RGGI choice of taking a different 
benchmark year for its emissions reductions (2009 instead of 1990) 
makes the systems not fully comparable to the others, while the 
Californian target of returning to the 1990 level does not appear 
to be so stringent in absolute terms.27 However, in April 2015, 
the Californian Governor issued a much more ambitious target, 
namely, reducing GHG emissions by 40% with respect to the 1990 
levels by 2030. This revised target is in line with the EU-28 target 
for 2030, denoting the desire to converge on common targets in 
the future across different ETS regimes.
A totally different approach has been adopted, instead, by 
China where all pilot ETSs have set their own targets in terms of 
emission intensity reduction (see Table A1 in Appendix). Although 
27 By stringency, we refer here to the effort imposed by the regulator according 
to the emission reduction target, which can be measured by the ratio of emis-
sions to allocated allowances (cf. Borghesi et al., 2015). Notice, however, that 
the price of the emission allowances can also be seen as a proxy of regulation 
stringency, as it enters other measures of environmental policy stringency, 
such as the Pollution Abatement Cost Expenditures and the survey-based 
perception of stringency. In this regard, the Californian regime may look more 
stringent than the other two since the allowance price is currently much higher 
in the Californian cap-and-trade system than in the EU ETS and in the RGGI 
(see previous footnote for a comparison of current prices). See Brunel and 
Levinson (2013) and Kozluk and Zipperer (2013) for reviews of the existing 
measures of environmental policy stringency and a detailed discussion of their 
shortcomings.
abating emission intensity (i.e., emissions per unit of GDP) 
improves the eco-efficiency of the economic system, this is not 
comparable to the target of reducing total emissions that has been 
set by the European and North-American ETSs discussed above. 
Indeed, a lower emission intensity can be consistent with higher 
total emissions as long as the latter grow more slowly than GDP. 
In this sense, while the other main ETSs seem to move in the 
same direction toward similar or common targets, at the moment 
the route chosen by the Chinese government deeply departs from 
that of the others.
Other features of ETS regimes show remarkable differences 
that set the followers apart from the EU ETS. This applies in 
particular to the adoption of price floors and ceilings. While the 
EU ETS has neither a price floor, nor a price ceiling,28 a different 
choice has been made by the three other ETSs analyzed, which 
have all chosen an intermediate path, whereby a price floor, but 
not a price ceiling is provided.29 Having a price floor has proved 
to be crucially important in particular for the US-based regimes, 
28 The only exception among the countries taking part to the EU ETS is represented 
by the UK that in August 2013 has unilaterally introduced a price floor equal to £16 
per tonne of CO2, which is expected to rise over time. The government decision 
has been criticised by many commentators, for the risk that companies pass the 
cost on to consumer energy bills and for the competition loss that UK firms may 
suffer as compared to their competitors in the rest of Europe where the price floor 
does not apply.
29 All the three followers taken into account, however, adopt allowance price con-
tainment reserves. Such reserves represent a soft price ceiling as the government 
is prepared to sell a fixed amount of allowances at a given price, but do not set an 
absolute limit on the price (the so-called hard price cap). As PMR and ICAP (2016) 
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as both the RGGI and the Californian ETS allowance prices 
have basically hit the floor in their early stages of application. As 
emerges from Figure 2 – that compares the price trends of the 
EUAs, Californian, and RGGI carbon allowances for the period 
2008–2015 – the Californian ETS has shown a price volatility that 
resembles the one characterizing the EU ETS, with the Californian 
price that has fallen down to $12.22 in August 2013 moving on 
a declining trend toward its floor (set at US$10/unit in 2012 and 
increased by 5% plus inflation rate every year). Even in the case 
of the flatter price trend of the RGGI, it is possible to identify a 
tendency of the emission price to decline toward the price floor, 
falling from 2.97 in 2009 to 1.96 in 2010 and tracking the floor 
price (US$1.86 in 2010 and US$1.89 in 2011) from September 
2010 onward. During that period the share of secondary market 
exchange-based transactions collapsed from 85% in 2009 to 6% 
in 2011; therefore, the existence of a price floor prevented RGGI 
price from declining even further. A price floor has been intro-
duced also in the province of Guangdong, which is the largest 
among the Chinese pilot projects and the first to use auctioning 
(see Table A1 in Appendix). Also in this case, available evidence 
confirms the tendency to hit the floor: during the first 5 months 
of implementation of the project (December 2013–April 2014), 
the average price [61.8 Chinese Yuan (CNY)] turned out to be 
very close to the price floor (60 Yuan) initially set by the regulator 
authority (World Bank, 2014). Even in Guangdong, therefore, the 
price floor was effective and probably helped agents progressively 
adapt to the introduction of the new ETS regime. In this regard, 
it may be argued that the followers of the EU ETS might have 
actually improved the functioning of their ETS with respect to 
the original EU model and that the introduction of a similar price 
floor in the EU ETS would have probably prevented the European 
price from collapsing.30
THe eU eTS AND iTS FOLLOweRS: 
COMMON TReNDS AND LiNKiNG 
PeRSPeCTiveS
The analysis performed above has shown many common features 
in the different ETSs, especially with regard to their scope, alloca-
tion method and overall climate change goals to be achieved. As 
a consequence, a first trend that can be identified is that all the 
ETSs tend to converge to a common structure. Moreover, the ETS 
is recognized in all the countries analyzed as a key tool to tackle 
climate change (Grubb et al., 2014), though not the only one. In 
fact, all the countries analyzed tend to implement their respective 
cap-and-trade schemes along with other renewable energy and 
energy efficiency instruments, within the broader context of their 
national climate change policy.
Furthermore, another emerging trend is the provision of 
special, softer regimes, protecting the national industrial sector 
from the major risks related to the loss of competitiveness as a 
(p. 113) point out, this “provides some assurance to the market, but not a guarantee, 
that the price will not rise above that level.”
30 For a discussion and comparison of the possible mechanisms to implement a 
price floor and the related implementation pitfalls see Wood and Jotzo (2011).
consequence of the ETS obligations. All the ETSs analyzed (RGGI 
excluded) endorse this choice, envisaging a direct, free allocation 
of allowances rather than auctioning, for some exposed sectors, 
while requiring a rigorous identification of the sectors benefiting 
from these special regimes (to be determined by the law) and 
usually providing for these exemption regimes to be temporary.
Finally, all the ETSs analyzed foresee some possibilities of 
“linking” with other project-based GHG emissions offset pro-
grams. For instance, the EU ETS allows installations to use Clean 
Development Mechanisms and Joint Implementation credits for 
compliance purposes. Similarly, the RGGI, the Californian, and 
the Quebec cap-and-trade systems allow the use of credits pro-
duced from national offset projects carried out in specific sectors, 
although the sectors involved differ across the ETSs. Moreover, all 
the ETSs allowing for such types of linking solutions (i.e., allow-
ing the use of “external” credits for compliance purposes within 
the ETS), set specific limitations in the amount or percentage of 
credits that can be used for that purpose, and prescribe specific 
conditions for the eligibility of the projects generating the offset 
credits. Notice that if two ETSs are unilaterally linked to an offset 
market it follows that they will be automatically linked to each 
other. In other words, unilateral linking of each ETS to common 
offset programs can generate indirect linking across ETSs.
Beyond this “unilateral” kind of linking, with each ETS rec-
ognizing credits produced from various offset projects, another 
common feature that is emerging among most ETSs is their effort 
to establish “bilateral” linking. By this, we mean that one ETS can 
link to another ETS, so that both ETSs involved mutually recog-
nize their allowances as eligible for compliance under either of 
the two programs, thus enabling a two-way flow of allowances.31 
So far, the only existing example of bilateral linking in opera-
tion is the one between California and Quebec, which has been 
established by means of an international agreement signed by 
the Parties in 2013. However, several other jurisdictions are cur-
rently considering the conclusion of similar linking agreements. 
For instance, the EU had reached a preliminary agreement with 
Australia for a bilateral linking, to be started in 2018, but this 
was eventually abandoned due to Australian government’s deci-
sion to repeal its ETS legislation after the 2013 elections. As a 
consequence, the EU is now looking for other partners for the 
development of bilateral linking agreements that would allow to 
extend the carbon market and fully exploit the increasing returns 
to scale that larger markets can generate. The possible emergence 
of some bilateral linking agreements in the near future has the 
potential to modify the economic equilibria among the existing 
ETSs in the years to come. Think, for instance, of the role that the 
nation-wide Chinese ETS – that is expected to emerge in the near 
future – would play in the international context. The giant dimen-
sion of such a system would make it a very attractive partner for 
bilateral linkings to expand the number of potential purchasers/
sellers of one’s own allowances. A bilateral linking, moreover, 
would probably help the commercial relationships between the 
linked countries, further reinforcing the attractiveness of linking 
31 See Borghesi et al. (2016b) for a discussion of the different kinds of linking and 
of the necessary and optional features that ETS regimes need to have to achieve 
linking agreements.
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to China. For these reasons, we may reasonably expect that in 
the years to come the main ETS regimes will fight to conquest 
the most attractive partners (including but not limited to China). 
This might jeopardize the leadership role played by the EU ETS 
so far, possibly transforming it from forerunner into follower 
again.
THe BeST AND wORST OF eTSs
The comparative analysis performed in the previous sections 
highlights positive and negative aspects of the ETSs, some of 
which are shared by most ETSs, while others represent idiosyn-
cratic features of a single ETS regime. In this section, we briefly 
summarize these positive and negative aspects, what we some-
how ironically call “the best and worst” of the ETSs, to provide 
a roadmap of what to preserve, extend or change in the future 
design of the ETSs.
One natural candidate to be introduced in the shortlist of the 
best features is certainly the existence of heterogeneous instal-
lations, coming from different sectors and producing different 
GHGs. This element plays a crucial role for effective trading as it 
allows to exploit different marginal abatement costs. In this sense, 
the progressive extension to additional sectors and GHGs of the 
EU ETS certainly went in the right direction, while this feature 
might need to be further developed in other contexts, such as the 
RGGI that includes only power plants.
Another desirable feature that most ETSs have introduced is 
the phasing in of auctioning over time. While grandfathering can 
be initially justified by the desire to prevent a rapid increase in the 
costs for firms subject to a new ETS, the regulatory authority must 
clarify from the beginning that a free allocation of allowances can 
only be a temporary measure and should set a clear intertemporal 
path toward auctioning. This is not to say that auctioning is the 
panacea for all problems. Difficulties can arise also in the auc-
tioning design, as is well documented in the ETS literature (e.g., 
Cramton and Kerr, 2002; Smith and Swierzbinski, 2007). In our 
opinion, however, setting a clear time plan for the progressive 
introduction of auctioning can provide an important and credible 
signal that the new ETS is here to stay, which may induce firms 
to make plans and investments in eco-innovation in due time.
Another best practice of many ETSs (RGGI excluded) is the 
introduction of carbon leakage rules. The choice of adopting 
carbon leakage rules is somehow related to that of auctioning the 
allowances, though the one does not necessarily imply the other. 
While auctioning can reduce the risk of windfall profits that 
may derive from allocating allowances for free, the introduction 
of carbon leakage rules can lower the risk of delocalization that 
occurs in the case of unilateral environmental policies. Moreover, 
while auctioning may provoke the opposition of the industrial 
sector (that has to pay, differently from what happens with 
grandfathering), the existence carbon leakage rules can lower 
this opposition providing the necessary support of the industrial 
sector to the new instrument. These two measures, therefore, 
can be seen as complementary instruments that should go hand-
in-hand in the design of an ETS. For carbon leakage rules to be 
credible, the regulator must set ex ante clear and objective criteria 
to identify the sectors at risk of delocalization. In this sense, the 
criteria adopted by the EU and California of taking carbon inten-
sity and trade exposure as criteria to exempt from auctioning the 
sectors at risk of relocation can certainly be useful, although they 
might need to be partially improved in the future.32 What is to be 
avoided, instead, is a continuous extension of the sectors included 
in the list of those at risk of relocation,33 as this would undermine 
the credibility of the system inducing the perception that carbon 
leakage provisions are just an escamotage obtained by industrial 
lobbies to keep receiving allowances for free.
Beyond the risk of production relocation, another kind of 
leakage may arise in the ETS context. Many of the ETS examined 
here (e.g., EU ETS and RGGI) are pure source-based cap-and-
trade systems that set emission limitation on the emitting facility. 
This means they do not cover emissions embodied in imports 
from uncapped regions. In other words, to avoid the costs asso-
ciated with an ETS, the economic agents can either move their 
production activity to countries where no ETS is in place or they 
can simply import goods from such countries. To overcome this 
problem, the best practice among existing ETSs is probably the 
“first-seller approach” adopted by the Californian ETS whereby 
responsibility is assigned to the entity that first imports power 
into the State’s electricity market (Hobbs et  al., 2010). From 
this viewpoint, the Californian regime can be seen as a hybrid 
cap-and-trade “combining a source-based approach for in-state 
resources and emissions accounting for imports in order to limit 
emissions leakage” (Hobbs et al., 2010, p. 26).
Finally, another important provision for a well-functioning 
ETS may be given by the existence of de minimis rules for small 
installations. This provision, which is common to most existing 
ETSs, can be reasonably justified by the high transaction costs that 
small emitters (below some given threshold level) would have to 
face if they were exposed to the same rules as the other emitters.
Moving now to the “worst of ” side, we can distinguish two 
main groups of problems, that is, shortcomings in the cap-setting 
and in the way the ETSs operated. As to the first aspect, if the cap 
is set too high with respect to the actual demand for allowances, 
this will obviously result in a low allowance price; if, instead, 
the cap is frequently revised (e.g., due to scientific uncertainty 
on the correct number of allowances to be allocated), this will 
contribute to increase price volatility. In our view, both a low price 
and a highly volatile price may constitute problems that hinder 
the proper functioning of the ETS. A low allowance price gives 
agents no incentive to abandon the old polluting technologies and 
invest in new environmentally friendly ones. A highly unstable 
price generates uncertainty on the expected returns of invest-
ing in such technologies, which may discourage investments in 
eco-innovation.
32 As Martin et al. (2014a) have argued, the carbon intensity criterion is highly 
correlated to carbon leakage while trade intensity is not. They conclude that the 
current exemption criteria adopted by the EU ETS should be amended to consider 
a sector at risk of carbon leakage only if it is both trade intensive and carbon inten-
sive. See also Martin et al. (2014b) for the proposal of an efficient compensation 
scheme of industries at risk of relocation and for a discussion of its implications 
for the EU ETS.
33 See Borghesi et al. (2016b) for a complete list of all the sectors exempted from 
the auctioning of allowances under the EU ETS, the Californian regime and the 
Quebec regime.
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If one looks at the development of the main ETSs, it can be 
noticed that basically all regimes experienced high price volatility. 
This seems to apply not only to the price evolution of the EU ETS 
and of the Californian ETS pointed out above, but also to some of 
the Chinese pilot projects. For instance, in the case of Shenzhen 
(the first ETS to be implemented in China), prices ranged from 28 
to 30 CNY on June 19, 2013 (the first day of trading), raised up 
to the peak level of 93 CNY on September 10, 2013, they fell by 
about a third to around 60 CNY at the beginning of October 2013 
and then doubled to about 120 CNY in the same month (World 
Bank, 2014). This erratic price trend might have contributed to 
discourage traded volumes that steadily declined from 21,112 
tons of emissions allowances the day the market was launched to 
about 1,000 tons of emissions allowances on September 24, 2013. 
This roller coaster-like trend in the Shenzhen Emissions Exchange 
probably denotes the difficulty of the operators to adapt to a new 
market and is likely to discourage eco-innovators, who search for 
price stability to develop their long run projects. However, a certain 
degree of price volatility in the allowance market can be consid-
ered physiological as it simply reflects fluctuations of demand and 
supply. In this sense, the problem is not price volatility per se but 
rather how the cap should be adjusted to account for unexpected 
changes of the economic conditions (e.g., economic recession, 
new legislation or developments of renewable resources, etc.).
As to the second set of shortcomings (concerning the way the 
ETS operates), important aspects that hinder the proper function-
ing of the ETS are the lack of temporal flexibility (banking and 
borrowing), of harmonized procedures for verification, monitor-
ing, and reporting, and of appropriate provisions for linking with 
offset markets and other systems. As pointed out in the previous 
sections, the lack of these aspects has proved to be critical for 
the EU in the past. Most of the operational problems described 
for the EU ETS did not emerge among the followers so far. In 
some cases (e.g., initial over-allocation), this may be ascribed to 
the fact that while the EU ETS is a transnational market that needs 
international coordination among its MS, other ETSs operate 
within national boundaries under a uniform set of rules. It follows 
that, even in the case of inter-States ETSs, such as the RGGI, more 
similar regulations apply across its members as they are part of the 
same country. Another reason is that the other ETSs are simply 
more recent than the EU ETS; one cannot exclude, therefore, that 
different, more idiosyncratic operational problems might emerge 
in the future for the followers too. A final reason might be that 
followers learned from the initial mistakes of the EU ETS, which 
was then a prototype to observe but not necessarily a model to be 
copied in all its aspects. On the contrary, as someone has ironi-
cally argued (The Economist, 2013) referring to the difficulties 
encountered by the EU ETS, the latter might have progressively 
become an example for the other regimes of what not to do.
CONCLUSiON
The ETS is going through a crucial moment in the history of 
the climate change policy tools. In a few years, it has become a 
milestone instrument for tackling climate change and is rapidly 
spreading in different jurisdictions, as the preferred tool for pric-
ing carbon.
In such a context, as already noted above, it is correct to 
state that the EU ETS has represented the prototype regime 
with respect to all other similar experiences. With this in 
mind, in the present article, the origin and the evolution of 
the EU ETS have been described, with a glimpse on its future 
perspectives. The analysis conducted above has shown that 
through the years the EU has modified its role in the use of 
market-based instruments, such as the cap-and-trade schemes, 
passing from follower to forerunner. However, the success of 
EU ETS has been marked not only by great achievements but 
also by relevant shortcomings. In fact, the impressive rapidity 
and efficacy of the EU in building a huge carbon market in 
a relatively short period of time was counterbalanced by the 
existence of some relevant drawbacks, which undermined the 
effectiveness of the system, namely the mix of low average 
price and high price volatility, as well as governance issues and 
administration problems.
In this sense, it should be highlighted that even the undeni-
able success of the EU ETS in achieving remarkable emission 
reductions in a short time period may be questioned on the 
basis of the concurrent role played the great economic crisis 
that affected Europe in recent years. On the basis of this line 
of reasoning, appropriate corrective measures and a continuous 
monitoring of the EU ETS functioning need to be adopted to 
avoid that, once the crisis will be hopefully over, emissions may 
start increasing again.
Moreover, also the technological innovation allegedly induced 
by the EU ETS might be questioned. To this effect, it will be neces-
sary to gather further evidence in the years to come, in order 
to determine with a sufficient degree of certainty whether the 
EU ETS has really managed to promote a considerable level of 
technological change in the European market.
Given the problems encountered by the EU ETS prototype 
during these years, we have then compared it with the other rel-
evant ETS regimes that emerged as main followers of the EU ETS, 
namely the RGGI, the Californian cap-and-trade system, and the 
Quebec cap-and-trade system. As argued in this paper, these 
followers share with the EU ETS some common flaws, especially 
in terms of price volatility, but they have also shown the capacity 
to innovate and possibly devise alternative ways to manage their 
own ETS regimes, which may in the long term jeopardize the EU 
leadership in the ETS context.
In particular, as far as price volatility is concerned, the deci-
sion by all followers to introduce a price floor turned out to be 
very useful to prevent their prices from decreasing even further 
during the recent deep recession. In this regard, the EU should 
probably learn from the followers and introduce a price floor in 
the near future. If not, the price of the European allowances may 
keep falling and end up becoming an application of what could 
be provocatively defined “the polluter does not pay principle.” 
In other words, without any price floor the price can become so 
low that polluters have no incentive to abate their pollution levels. 
If this is the case, the ETS would become nothing but one addi-
tional financial instrument, losing the environmental motivation 
underlying its origin. A risk that, in our view, all ETSs should try 
to avoid, in order to preserve their credibility as suitable instru-
ments to fight climate change in the future.
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TABLe A1 | The Chinese pilot projects: main features.
Starting 
date
Compliance 
periods (CP)
Target Benchmark 
year
GHG Sectors Threshold Deadlines 
(month/
day)
Price  
ceilings and 
floor
Allocation 
method
exemptions 
for carbon 
leakage
Offset programs Banking/
Borrowing
Sanctions
Beijing  
Pilot 
ETS
2013 2013–2015 By 2015 (12th 
Five Year Plan): 
18% reduction 
in carbon 
intensity 
compared to 
2010 levels
2010 CO2 Industrial and 
non-industrial 
companies and 
entities, including 
electricity 
providers, 
heating sector, 
cement, 
petrochemicals, 
manufacturers, 
and service 
sector
 ≥10,000 
tCO2/year, 
considering 
both direct 
and indirect 
emissions
06/15 Price 
management 
provisions: in 
case of market 
fluctuations, 
the Beijing 
Development 
and Reform 
Commission 
(DRC) can 
buy or auction 
allowances in 
order to stabilize 
the market
Mainly 
grandfathering 
based on  
2009–2012 
emissions or 
emissions intensity. 
Benchmarking 
for new entrants 
and entities with 
expanded capacity
N.A. Domestic project-
based carbon offset 
credits – China 
Certified Emission 
Reduction (CCER) – 
are allowed. Maximum 
use of CCER credits 
= 5% of the annual 
allocation, of which at 
least 50% have to be 
from projects within 
the jurisdiction of the 
city of Beijing
Banking 
allowed 
during the 
pilot phase. 
There are 
currently 
no rules on 
borrowing
Penalties range: 
from CNY 30,000 
(EUR 3,926) to 
CNY 50,000 (EUR 
6,544). Fines = 3 
to 5 times average 
market price for 
each missing 
allowance
Chongqing 
Pilot ETS
2014 2013–2015 By 2015 (12th 
Five Year 
Plan): 17% 
reduction 
in carbon 
intensity 
compared to 
2010 levels
2010 CO2, 
CH4, 
N2O, 
HFCs, 
PFCs, 
SF6
Not specified, 
but covered 
sectors include 
power, electrolytic 
aluminum, 
ferroalloys, 
calcium carbide, 
cement, caustic 
soda, and iron 
and steel
 ≥20,000t 
CO2e/year.
Due to the 
late start, 
compliance 
for 2013 
and 
2014 are 
combined 
in one 
phase. 
Deadline 
for 2015: 
06/20
Price 
management 
provisions: in 
case of market 
fluctuations, 
the regulator 
can take price 
stabilization 
measures. 
Compliance 
entities must not 
sell more than 
50% of their free 
allocation
Grandfathering 
based on historic 
emissions (highest 
number in period 
2008–2012). If the 
sum of allocation 
for all enterprises 
exceeds the cap, a 
reduction factor is 
applied
N.A. Domestic project-
based carbon offset 
credits – China 
Certified Emission 
Reduction (CCER) 
– are allowed. 
Maximum use of 
CCER credits = 8% 
of annual emissions
Banking 
allowed 
during the 
pilot phase. 
Borrowing 
not allowed
Penalties range: 
from CNY 20,000 
(EUR 2,618) to 
CNY 50,000 (EUR 
6,544)
Guangdong 
Pilot ETS
2013 2013–2015 By 2015: 
(12th Five 
Year Plan): 
19.5% 
reduction 
in carbon 
intensity 
compared to 
2010 levels
2010 CO2 Energy, iron and 
steel, cement, 
petro chemicals. 
Ceramics, 
textiles, non-
ferrous metals, 
chemicals, pulp 
and paper, 
construction, 
and 
transportation 
sectors may be 
included during 
the pilot phase 
at a later stage
 ≥20,000 
tCO2/year 
or energy 
consumption 
10,000tCe/
year
First 
compliance 
period 
deadline: 
15 July 
2014. Then, 
normally, 
each year 
deadline: 
06/20
Price floor for 
the auctions. 
Initially, set at 
CNY 60 (EUR 
7.85). After the 
completion 
of the first 
compliance 
phase, the price 
was lowered to 
CNY 25 (EUR 
3.27) and will 
increase to CNY 
40 (EUR 5.24) in 
steps of CNY 5 
(EUR 0.65) with 
each quarterly 
auction
Mainly 
grandfathering 
based on 2009–
2012 emissions 
and benchmarking 
for certain industrial 
processes and new 
entrants. During 
the pilot phase 
three, 3% (2013) 
to 10% (2015) of 
allowances are 
auctioned. During 
the first compliance 
year, participation 
in auctions was 
mandatory to 
receive free 
allocation
N.A. Domestic project-
based carbon offset 
credits – China 
Certified Emission 
Reduction (CCER) 
– are allowed. 
Maximum use of 
CCER credits = 10% 
of the annual verified 
emissions, of which 
at least 70% have to 
be from projects from 
within the jurisdiction 
of the province of 
Guangdong
Banking 
allowed 
during the 
pilot phase. 
No rules on 
borrowing
Penalties range: 
from CNY 10,000 
(EUR 1,309) to CNY 
50,000 (EUR 6,544). 
Companies failing to 
surrender enough 
allowances to match 
their emissions 
will be deducted 
twice the amount 
of allowances from 
next year’s allocation 
and are fined CNY 
50,000 (EUR 6,544)
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Starting 
date
Compliance 
periods (CP)
Target Benchmark 
year
GHG Sectors Threshold Deadlines 
(month/
day)
Price  
ceilings and 
floor
Allocation 
method
exemptions 
for carbon 
leakage
Offset programs Banking/
Borrowing
Sanctions
Hubei Pilot 
ETS
2014 2013–2015 By 2015 (12th 
Five Year 
Plan): 17% 
reduction 
in carbon 
intensity 
compared to 
2010 levels
2010 CO2 Power and 
heat supply, 
iron and steel, 
chemicals, 
petro chemicals, 
cement, 
automobile
manufacturing, 
ferrous metals, 
glass, pulp and 
paper, food, 
and beverage
Energy 
consumption 
≥60,000 
tCe/year
Due to the 
late start, 
compliance 
for 2013 
and 
2014 are 
combined
in one 
phase. 
Deadline 
for 2015: 
05/31
In case 
of market 
fluctuations, 
the regulator 
can take price 
stabilization 
measures
Mainly 
grandfathering 
based on historic 
emissions, also 
considering early 
action and sector-
specific factors
A smaller 
proportion of 
allowances are 
auctioned to 
complement the 
allocation process
N.A. Domestic project-
based carbon offset 
credits – China 
Certified Emission 
Reduction (CCER) 
– from
the province of 
Hubei are allowed. 
Maximum use of 
CCER credits = 
10% of the annual 
allocation
Banking 
allowed 
during the 
pilot phase. 
Borrowing 
not allowed
Penalties range: 
from CNY 10,000 
(EUR 1,309) to 
CNY 150,000 
(EUR 19,632). 
Companies failing 
to surrender 
enough allowances 
to match their 
emissions will 
be deducted 
twice the amount 
of allowances 
from next year’s 
allocation and are 
fined one to three 
times the average 
market price for 
every allowance
Shanghai  
Pilot ETS 
2013 2013–2015 By 2015 (12th 
Five Year 
Plan): 19% 
reduction 
in carbon 
intensity 
compared to 
2010
2010 CO2 Industrial 
sectors: 
electricity, iron 
and steel, 
petro chemicals, 
chemicals, 
non-ferrous 
metals, building 
materials, 
textiles, 
paper, rubber, 
chemical fiber
Power and 
industry: 
≥20,000t 
CO2/year; 
Non-
industry: 
≥10,000t 
CO2/year, 
considering 
both direct 
and indirect 
emissions
06/30 If prices vary 
more than 
30% in 1 day, 
the regulator 
can take price 
stabilization 
measures, 
temporarily 
suspend trading 
or impose 
holding limits. 
Minimum 
auction price 
in the one-off 
2013 auction 
= 120% of the 
average market 
price from the 
last 30 trading 
days [CNY 48 
(EUR 6.29)] 
One-off free 
allocation for 
2013–2015 based 
on 2009–2011 
emissions, 
considering 
company growth 
and benchmarks 
for certain 
sectors (energy, 
airlines, ports, 
and airports). 
Ex post allocation 
adjustments 
(e.g., based on 
production data) 
are possible. In 
2013, a one-off 
auction took 
place before 
the compliance 
deadline
N.A. Domestic project-
based carbon offset 
credits – China 
Certified Emission 
Reduction (CCER) 
– are allowed. 
Maximum use of 
CCER credits = 
5% of the annual 
allocation
Banking 
allowed 
during the 
pilot phase. 
No rules on 
borrowing
Penalties range: 
from CNY 10,000 
(EUR 1,308) to 
CNY 50,000 
(EUR 6,544) can 
be imposed for 
non-compliance. 
In case of serious 
violations, further 
sanctions may 
be imposed, 
e.g., entry into 
the credit record 
of the company, 
publication on 
the internet, 
cancelation of 
ability to access 
special funds 
for energy 
conservation 
and emissions 
reduction 
measures
Non-industrial 
sectors: 
aviation, 
ports, airports, 
railways, 
commercial, 
hotels, and 
financial sector
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Starting 
date
Compliance 
periods (CP)
Target Benchmark 
year
GHG Sectors Threshold Deadlines 
(month/
day)
Price  
ceilings and 
floor
Allocation 
method
exemptions 
for carbon 
leakage
Offset programs Banking/
Borrowing
Sanctions
Shenzhen 
Pilot ETS
2013 2013–2015 By 2015 (12th 
Five Year 
Plan): 21% 
reduction 
in carbon 
intensity 
compared to 
2010 levels
2010 CO2 Power, water 
supply, 
manufacturing 
sectors, 
buildings
 ≥5,000 
tCO2e/
year for 
enterprises; 
≥20,000 m2 
for public 
buildings 
and 10,000 
m2 for 
government 
buildings
06/30 In case 
of market 
fluctuations, 
the Shenzhen 
DRC can 
either sell extra 
allowances 
from a reserve 
at a fixed price, 
that can only 
be used for 
compliance 
and cannot 
be traded, or 
buy back up to 
10% of the total 
allocation
Grandfathering 
based on 
sector-specific 
carbon intensity 
benchmarks. 
In addition, a 
game theoretical 
approach 
accounting for 
the companies’ 
own estimations 
of output and 
emissions 
is applied to 
manufacturing 
companies. Ex post 
adjustments are 
possible. In 2014, 
3% of allowances 
were auctioned. 
Progressive 
transition toward 
full auctioning 
planned in the 
long run
N.A. Domestic project-
based carbon offset 
credits – China 
Certified Emission 
Reduction (CCER) 
– are allowed. 
Maximum use of 
CCER credits = 
10% of the annual 
allocation
Banking 
allowed 
during the 
pilot phase. 
Borrowing 
not allowed
Penalties range: 
from CNY 50,000 
(EUR 6,544) to 
CNY 150,000 
(EUR 19,632). 
Furthermore, 
companies failing 
to surrender 
enough allowances 
to match their 
emissions are fined 
three times the 
average market 
price of the past 
6 months. The 
missing allowances 
can be withdrawn 
from the account 
of the company or 
deducted from next 
year’s allocation
Tianjin Pilot 
ETS
2013 2013–2015 By 2015 (12th 
Five Year 
Plan): 19% 
reduction 
in carbon 
intensity 
compared to 
2010 levels
2010 CO2 Heat and 
electricity 
production, 
iron and steel, 
petrochemicals, 
chemicals, 
exploration of oil 
and gas
 ≥20,000 
tCO2/year 
considering 
both direct 
and indirect 
emissions
The first 
compliance 
period 
ended on 
25 July 
2014. 
Normally, 
compliance 
period: 
one year. 
Deadline: 
05/31
In case 
of market 
fluctuations, 
the Tianjin DRC 
can buy or sell 
allowances in 
order to stabilize 
the market
Mainly 
grandfathering 
based on 2009–
2012 emissions or 
emissions intensity. 
Benchmarking for 
new entrants and 
expanded capacity
N.A. Domestic project-
based carbon offset 
credits – China 
Certified Emission 
Reduction (CCER) 
– are allowed. 
Maximum use of 
CCER credits = 10% 
of the annual verified 
emissions
Banking 
allowed 
during the 
pilot phase. 
Borrowing 
not allowed
In case of non-
compliance, 
companies are 
disqualified for 
preferential financial 
support and 
policies for 3 years
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on ICAP – International Carbon Action Partnership (2015); PMR (Partnership for Market Readiness) and ICAP (International Carbon Action Partnership) (2016).
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